The hearing will come to order.

Good morning to all. I appreciate our two panels that we have

here today. We have a lot of distance to try to cover, and so, we’re

going to see if we can move relatively rapidly.

As everybody knows, today’s hearing explores America’s need to

craft a comprehensive strategy for Sudan. For years, the urgency

of either the situation in Darfur or the long war between the North

and the South Sudan drove United States policy in one direction

or another. Many people are not aware—because when they hear

the word ‘‘Sudan,’’ they automatically think Darfur, and there are

obvious and justifiable reasons for that—but many people are not

aware that the longest war in the history of Africa, and one which

took the lives of over 2 million people, occurred between the North

and the South in Sudan.

Over time, the fact that either Darfur or the long war between

the North and the South has driven our policy has really resulted

in a bifurcated policy. Today, I think most people understand that

we cannot and should not pursue either of these challenges, North/

South or Darfur, as if they exist in a vacuum. As the Save Darfur

Coalition affirmed in a statement for the record, ‘‘Policymakers

have too often focused on the South, to the detriment of Darfur, or

Darfur, to the detriment of the South.’’

At the same time, many discussions of United States-Sudan policy

here in Washington continue to center on the question of

whether we should use carrots versus sticks, rewards or punishments,

to influence Sudan leaders in Khartoum. When I visited

Sudan in April of this year, I came away convinced that we need

to build a broader strategic framework that moves beyond simple

oppositions, like carrots versus sticks, or North—or South versus

Darfur. Instead, we need—that dreaded word, ‘‘nuanced’’—a comprehensive

strategy for Sudan as a whole.

We should begin by identifying our objectives. Our primary goals

in Sudan are: Helping to achieve peace and security in Darfur and

the surrounding region; maintaining and strengthening peace

between North and South Sudan; expanding cooperation on counterterrorism;

and promoting democracy and conflict prevention

throughout the country. These are our objectives, our principal

objectives, and the question is how best to achieve them.

I believe that the ongoing consequences of the genocide in

Darfur—and I called it such way back in 2004, as a candidate for

President—and the onrushing potential tragedy of a renewed

North-South war together create a dynamic that demands high level

and sustained engagement.

As the President’s special envoy, Gen. Scott Gration has already

traveled to the region multiple times, and he comes to this task

with a long understanding of the region, and a passion for the

region, I might add.

Last week, General Gration was in Abyei, Sudan, at the center

of North-South tensions. His presence on the ground, when the

Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration announced a decision on

Abyei’s borders, symbolized America’s recommitment to the peace

process. We need to make the same commitment to finding peace

in Darfur.

Almost 5 years ago, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell testified

before this committee that the United States had found a consistent

and widespread pattern of atrocities that constituted genocide.

He recommended that America increase the number of

African Union monitors, and today the African Union monitoring

mission has been merged into the United Nations peacekeeping

mission, UNAMID. I can tell you from firsthand visit, as well as

from the data that we get, UNAMID is making a difference, but

it has yet to be fully deployed or to acquire full tactical mobility.

Millions of people remain in camps under conditions made even

worse when Khartoum expelled 13 humanitarian organizations,

placing over a million people in potential jeopardy. General Gration

was right to make his first priority as special envoy the restoration

of lifesaving assistance, but we need to go further.

When I was in Khartoum, I emphasized to the Sudanese that

restoring lost aid was imperative, but also insufficient. Our goal

should not be to recreate the conditions that existed before the

NGO expulsion, it should be to move beyond those conditions.

Maintenance of a miserable status quo is not a solution. I strongly

support the efforts of the African Union, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation,

and others, to bring the voices of civil society into the discussion,

and particularly to ensure that women are heard.

At the same time, we need to recognize that, even as we work

toward peace in western Sudan and in eastern Chad, the clock is

relentlessly ticking down the hours between now and 2011. And

2011 is a critical date. That is when the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement allows Southern Sudanese to vote on the question of

unity or separation from the North. If the people of Sudan are to

transform a cease-fire and an uneasy power-sharing agreement into

lasting peace, we need to think of the CPA as the ongoing process

stretching into the future, not as an event in the past. Today, crucial

elements remain unresolved, including borders, citizenship,

and revenue-sharing. A central focus of my visit to Sudan was to

convince both sides to embark on a series of tripartite discussions

with the United States to tackle these remaining challenges.

Rising violence in the South is also a matter of growing concern,

and underscores the need for tangible peace dividend. But, even as

we move forward, we must not fix our gaze on the 2011 referendum

alone. We also need to consider what Sudan could look like in 2012,

in 2015, and beyond.

All of these issues and more, including complex regional forces,

need to be balanced within a comprehensive United States strategy

for Sudan.

Today, we have an impressive array of witnesses to help us explore

these issues. Gen. Scott Gration serves as President Obama’s

Special Envoy to Sudan. Before that, he served as a major general

in the U.S. Air Force. And we’re eager to hear his insights on the

situation in Sudan, and the direction that our policy will take.

Earl Gast is the Acting Administrator for Africa for the U.S.

Agency for International Development, and he, too, has traveled to

Sudan to advance humanitarian access.

On our second panel, former Ambassador David Shinn is currently

teaching at the Elliott School of International Affairs at

George Washington University. He served in the U.S. Foreign Service

for 37 years, including 3 in Sudan, and he was also Director of

East African and Horn of African Affairs in the State Department.

Dr. Mohammed Ahmed Eisa is a physician with the Sudan Organization

for Rights and Peace-Building. In 2007, Dr. Mohammed

was named the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award laureate.

And in addition to his work as a physician, he is a respected community

leader, peace negotiator, and human rights advocate.

And finally, Susan Page is the regional director for Southern and

East Africa for the National Democratic Institute. From 2005 to

2007, Ms. Page directed the Rule of Law Program for the United

Nations mission in Sudan, and she has advised those involved in

both the CPA and the Darfur peace process.

Thank you very much, Administrator Gast.

General, share with us, if you will, your perceptions of the situation

on the ground, the dynamics on the ground in Darfur now, and

particularly the current status of activities of the principal rebel

groups.

JEM, I take it, is still receiving support from

Chad, and still—across the border—and operating in a cross-border

fashion?

Well, the Government of Chad would argue that

part of their support stems from the fact that the Government of

Sudan has been supporting efforts against them, and you get this

back-and-forth. Can you comment on that?

And what conclusions have you been able to

draw about the current relationship and support structure between

the Government in Khartoum and the Janjaweed?

And what happens as you raise that issue with

Khartoum officials?

What would you say, to the committee, is the

level of violence in Darfur itself today? How would you describe the

on-the-ground situation with respect to killing and raids and so

forth?

It was my perception, as I met with and listened

to Minni Minnawi, and as I talked to the various representatives

and just looked at the situation on the ground, that some of the

rebel groups have, sort of, withdrawn from major activities, that

over the last year or more, there has been a significant reduction

in their activity.

And I think the leaders that I met with in El Fasher were saying

to me that there were maybe a total of some 500 folks, over the

course of an entire year, that had lost their lives, and many were

in criminal activities, as you’ve described.

So, where does that put us, in the context of debate that people

have about the events of 2004 and 2005 and the genocide that

Colin Powell, myself, and others, and all of us have referred to, the

atrocities that took place, and the sort of status that we find today?

Is there a distinction? Is it a distinction without a difference? Or

does it affect our policy, in your judgment?

Which raises, obviously, our deeper concerns

about the North-South peace and the CPA.

Just a last question, quickly; my time is up. Well, I’m going to—

I won’t ask it. We have a lot of Senators here, and we need to get

through.

Well, let me just say that it’s a very important

issue with respect to any kind of policy determination that we

make, and the committee will have a classified session in order to

explore this so that we can make an intelligent set of judgments.

And I appreciate your raising the issue, and it’s one that we need

to go at anyway, so we will. And we’ll do it in the right setting.

I was struck by your notion that this was not the

most secure setting in the world, I just——

Can’t imagine why you thought

that.

Thank you, Senator.

We’re going to move, in a moment, to the next panel.

Let me just share with you, Senator Wicker—I think there’s a

debate that is important, obviously, with respect to our policy and

the choices that we have available to us. It’s also a debate that is

fraught with some difficulties, at this point in time, which is why

intelligent and committed people can have differences of opinion.

According to Article 2 of the Genocide convention, genocide

means any of the following five acts committed with intent to

destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious

group: One, killing members of the group; two, causing serious bodily

or mental harm to members of the group; three, deliberately

inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about

its physical destruction, in whole or in part—obviously, there could

be significant debate about the camps and people’s ability to move

back to where they ought to be, and the lack of provision by the

government of adequate protection, and so forth—imposing measures

intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly

transferring the children of the group to another group.

Now, international law includes, within genocide, this issue of

the creation of physical conditions that lead to the destruction of

the group, and so forth. There’s a lot of room for argument, here,

right now. I think what General Gration is saying to us in this debate

is that there are ongoing impacts. We’re living with it. Darfur

is living day-to-day hell in terms of the impact of what happened

in 2004 and 2005. But, obviously the kinds of activities of 2004 and

2005 that led to how many people is the accurate figure were

killed?

I mean what’s the best judgment about that?

Correct. And today, we have largely criminal

activity as a result of the conditions people are living in, which

takes some additional lives, but serious questions about, sort of,

whether it’s the remnants of that orchestrated violence or independent

acting, or otherwise, versus a government-driven effort, in

the way that it was in 2004 and 2005.

So, these are things we can argue about. The critical thing is,

folks, if we sit around and just do that all the time, we’re not going

to get those camps taken care of.

And, Mr. Gast, in his testimony, talked about the unsustainability

of the current situation. And I want you to just sort of paint

that picture for a minute. What do you mean by ‘‘unsustainability,’’

in the context of the post-March 4 events?

Let me ask you bluntly. Can the Government of

Khartoum facilitate our ability to do that better?

So, you feel that now there’s been——

A turn, since General Gration’s

visit, my visit, other visits—there’s a sense that they’re more

engaged in——

And do you feel——

Sorry.

Let me just say, Senator Wicker—that was a

very important line of inquiry. I want to be declarative, here,

because I think it’s important.

I believe that General Gration is on the right track. And I think

his engagement has saved lives, and it has advanced our ability to

be able to advance the peace process, both in Darfur and for the

CPA, North and South. And I think the consequences of not doing

both would be disastrous. So, we are presented with a difficult situation.

I also believe that what was happening in the overt manner

of 2004 and 2005 is not happening today.

Now, I’m not going to get caught up in the argument of semantics,

General Gration has appropriately said, ‘‘You know, we can

spend our time doing that.’’ The key here is, Is the Government of

Khartoum moving to address the critical humanitarian concerns

and advance the peace process itself? If it is, and we have to rely

on our experts, we have a very different situation confronting us.

And I think that is the key thing we have to look for in our policy,

that there are real asks, real measurements of what they’re doing,

and that we advance that process, and I think that’s exactly what

General Gration is doing. This timeframe is critical, and it’s going

to take heavy-lifting by heads of state and by special envoys and

others to advance this.

So, with that said, let me invite a seamless transition, hopefully,

to the second panel. I need to meet with some folks from the NSC

just for a minute. Senator Lugar is going to chair, in my absence,

momentarily.

So, General Gration and Administrator Gast, thank you for being

here.

We will leave the record open for a week. I know there will be

additional questions that will need clarification. Particularly, Mr.

Gast, I know you didn’t—we just didn’t have chance to get to some

of the things we need to know about the USAID program, and we

look forward to doing that.

Thank you for being here.

The government——

Right.

You don’t have what, sorry?

Yes.

Right.

In terms of the current dynamic of the principal

rebel groups, they’re certainly not engaged the way they were in

the kind of confrontation that was going on. But, the question I’d

ask you is—I think one Senator, Senator Menendez, mentioned

we’ve had three or four envoys; we’ve gone through a number of

‘‘getting close to agreements’’; we’ve gone through a number of

agreements; and within hours, or days even, of the agreement, people

have walked away, and it’s fallen apart, and so forth. Is there

something that is alive today, in this moment, that you think is different,

that we can capitalize on? Or, are we stuck in the same sort

of dynamic where we go around, we’ll get—you know, we’ll go

through this, sort of, meaningless agreement process?

And the political will has to be by all the parties.

Right.

What’s your judgment about that will? Is the will

there now, in your judgment?

Ambassador Shinn, what do you say about that?

So am I, actually. I think it is possible to put the

dynamics together. Very, very tough, big issues.

Ms. Page, maybe you want to comment on the—how you see the

North-South process within CPA, and the biggies of citizenship,

borders, and wealth-sharing.

But how do you explain the rise in violence in

the South? I mean, there is increased violence there in certain

areas. Do you view that as localized tribal confrontation, or is it

North-South?

Right.

Unfortunately, we are running up against the

clock, here, folks, which I regret enormously, because we could

obviously go on publicly here for some time. We’re going to need

to, again, leave the record open so we can follow up with you.

But, let me just try to close out a couple of quick questions, if

I can.

Dr. Mohammed, the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as the

CPA, many people felt, lacked a sufficient civil-process input. Could

you just share with me, very quickly, what—how can we make sure

that the civil society is properly heard in the process of this initiative,

or effort, with respect to Darfur?

Ambassador Shinn, I’d like you to also——

Well, I think that’s a good note, both of you, in

your comments—unless, Ms. Page, you wanted to add to that—but

I think that’s a good note to pull this together on. A little optimism,

and a sense of what is possible. I personally believe that.

I think some of those rebel groups, frankly—it was my perception

over there—are taking advantage of their Toyota Land Cruisers

and their guns and some money that flows their way, and there’s

not a lot of liberation theology driving many of them these days.

Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Thank you all for being here. Appreciate it very, very much.

Dr. Mohammed, what—how would you describe—we were—we

had that little discussion here about, sort of, what’s going on in

Darfur today, and what the situation is on the ground. You may

have already addressed this, and I apologize if so. But, I’d like to

hear your description of that. How would you describe what is happening

on the ground today in Darfur?